Efficient Market Hypothesis

Suppose that you have a logical argument, which seems compelling to you, that publicly available information has not been reflected in an asset's price. (One example might be here, otherwise I'm sure you can pick out a different argument that has occurred to you at some point.) If you have funds to invest, should you focus investment funds in that area? I would argue, generally no, because of Copernican (majoritarian) considerations, including various forms of the Efficient Market Hypothesis.

If, instead, you have a partially Ptolemaic viewpoint, and are logically consistent, you would probably come to the conclusion that, any time you see everyone else make what seems to you like a logical mistake, you should spend significant effort in determining how you can profit from the mistake.

For example, suppose you believe that, with probability p, you are now in a 'privileged epistemological position' that will increase your expected annual returns, from 1.06 to 1.10, if you actively (rather than passively) manage you portfolio. (But with probability 1-p, there is no such thing as a privileged epistemological position. If you actively manage, but there is no such thing as a privileged position, your expected returns go down to 1.05 because of transaction costs.) If your probability p is above 0.2, you would want to actively manage rather than passively manage.

The problem with active management, of course, is that in the existing market, for every winner there must be a loser. So there's a "meta-level" where the above must be, on average, bad advice. It's not clear to me how to consistently avoid these types of traps without recourse to a Copernican Epistemology.